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A mhsEon-synterns srchltecture, based on B highly modrtlftr infrastructure udiking open- 
standards hardware and software fnterfaces s the enabling technology Ls eS68ntht for 
affordable m d  sustainable space exploration programs. This mission-systems architecture 
requires (8)  robust cornmudcation betwecn heterogeneous systms, (b) high rd!ahi!iQ’, (c)  
minimal mission-to-mission reeonfiguration, (d) affordable development, system integrktion, 
end verification of systems, and (e) rnlnlmal susrainiag engineerin&. Tliis paper proposes 
such an architecture. Lessunf learned from the Space Shuttle progrsm and Earthbound 
compIex eagineered systems are applied tu deflnc the model. Technology projections 
reaching out 5 years are made t o  refine model details. 
- . . . . . . . . 
1.___Intko-ductio< 
physical level by large scale distances and hostile environernents, at the local level by allocation constraints, and 
at the support level by orgenizstional, socid and culturaI divides. Each of these cxoept for the lmg distances and 
by the NASA badmap  [ 11 
The paper will present fiur operationally signifioant C l i , t d R  that will be used in defming the systems and in 
aIlocating fimctions for local or remote performance. Three mjor  componcnts to be examined for their contribution 
to depIoying a successful mission system nrchitecr-are are: 
hos& envtomrnent w<Ii cJienge a p&ecsc && several iLmcs O ; J C ~  &&e$ o f ~ z c e  S ~ ~ ! Q Z $ ~ ~ G E  tzlvisGned 
A hardware layer based on a node-based nL-ork with Nnable redunbey,  automated fail-over baed on 
intelligent agents, and plug and play i n t c r a c h  that includes automaic reconfieuration based on detection 
and recognition of new components. 
A software architecture applicable &om the lowcsi level subsyslem to the integrated kission sysrem based 
on open-standards mjddltware, eg IEEE 1516. 
A transparent switching finmework of flight hardware, flight equivalent hardware, emulation of  flight 
hardware, and network-connected computers containing high-fidelity software models as well as stubs and 
harnesses necessmy for syscem testing. 
E. The Four Keys to Success ofhlission System Architecture 
“A oentrnl concept of the new US. National Virion for Space Exploration is that space exploration activities 
must be ‘Sustainable”’ (NASA’s 2004 K&RT Formulation Plan). Sustainability encompasses the following four 
key aeas that are cnikal to successful dcpbyrnept snd operatioils of the conceptual mission system architecture. 
Each of these criteria has built-in trades that if carried out consisrently and systematically will lead to an 
implementation rhat supports human space exploration for decades to come. 
Afforhble: Life cycle costs at each stage must be consistent with NASA budgc&. Unptznned spBcs m ~ s t  
be minimized. Future costs resulting from decisions made today should be well grounded with relevant 
validation and historical basis. The primary trade is when wjll a systmi or capability be &vail&!e md h 
what quantity. 
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- Reliable and safe: Future spnce exploration systems, ipfrastructures and missions must be safe and reliable. 
Safety will be defindd as “AS Safe As Reasonably Achievable” (ASAFU); analogous to the nuclear 
industries “As Low As Reasonably Achievable” (ALARA) when deciding on alternaiives involving human 
exposure to radiation. 
* Effective: The capabilities of a new system or mfitistructure must be worth the costs of developing, 
building, and owning them. The goals and objectives achieved by missions using those systems and 
jnfrastructure camponents must be w d  &e costs a d  rkks r;f nw&g them. . 
* Flexible: The -lies of new systems, infrastructures, and lechnologies should be capable of adapating to 
changing policy objectives, requirements, interfaces, The systems and 
infrastructures whould be capable of exteemion to support new missions. The principal focus of trades in 
bhis area is how rmcD flcxitdity is desired in each campone:t ~f the MSA. 
and operational scenarios. 
The three MSA Compantnts treated iu this paper support the four operations criteria as explrthed bt!ow: 
Reliability/Safety 
* Rcdundancy tuned to rhc IcveI required, whether N+l, N+M or f d 1  duplication where necessruy, to ~ v t  
quantifiable probability of nlission success. 
Effectiveness 
= Building upon recognized industiylspace stmdards significantly reduces costs and the risk of development 
while offering P highly effective combinarion of real-~mc: performance, scnlability, and fault-tolerance. 
Flexibiliry 
* 
* 
* 
Open-standards interfaces allow for technology evolution. 
Plug and Play suppoits the building block approach. 
Automated reconfiguration driven by intelligefit agents provides fast responses with minimal human 
d m d .  
m. Where Are The Chalienges? 
Technical challenges are txpected in providing the scalability reqnirod far increasingly more ambitious space 
missions. Advancing rechnology car] be counted on up TO a poinr. Robust ms..gi.s arc helpful, but must be paid far 
in advance with no guarantee h a y  will be use& 
Autonutic reconfigurnrim and h e  plug and play implementation require strict adhtrmcc to standards. Malcing 
the Sbydarcl heiffice Mziruc?..tc robust m~ugll: K3 E.G,XET~~ t l ~  Geed for u ; i i q ~  iiitiitcif~ces is ii t e c h ~ c d  
challenge to be addressed. But much of ht risk has been reduced by DOD and industry initiatives in High Lcvcl 
Archirecum (HLA) . Re-use of these HLAs eIiminates major owrhcad of developing such an hh.asmcture from 
scratch. So work can bc focused on jnterfaciug with c o m m  ULA interfaces rather than painful iterative 
refinement ofanother standard exclusive to the spacc community. 
Reconfiguration work must begin early so that major cost drivers such 99 number of modcs and states, interfaces, 
and size of the data and information base WiLl bz accurate. Adhtion of a mojor mode late in the development cycfe 
will have adverse effects on cost and scheduel while increasing program risk. Early defdtion of th tsc fcahucs 
provides a solid fouiidatian for mission system plamcrs and analyski to bcgin scenario development and anslysls. 
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This early start can be leveraged 10 gain much experience in safety related issues while there is still timc to 
accommodate changes. 
Each generation of aerospace modeling and sirnuintion faces new challenges since data becomes more refined, 
CPUs run faster, and smaller details become important in second order interactions. Other diEcuIties ccase to be a 
problem. No one dcveIops S i x  Degree of Frccdom simul~tion~ in Assembly Ianguage to fit CPU ptovisions 
anymore. But no one has a solid answer to automated reconfiguration requirements fbr life aiticd functions on very 
long term space missians. 
Based on recent experience, modeling and simulation approachcs should utilize: 
A, Tight coupling between the operational software, and that used for test, and lr&inirtg. 
B. Tight coupling of the simulators wirh the operational software. 
Ea& need projectiiins hi king &WE&M space mksims; new sthi mdel i lg  a;;d simdathn 8pp~adies  
should include: 
A. Use of mirrored networks for operational and simulations. 
B. On-board versions of the simulations for checkout, training, test, and procedures development. 
W. Flitare Vision 
Modeling and simulation will play an important role in tht development of new space systems. 'The 
_ d e s ~ l a p r n e n t a n h u s e f ~ ~ o ~ e ~ i m ~ t i ~ - ~ ~ . ~ ~ ~ c ~ n ~ ~ a c ~ - o ~ o * ~ d ~ ~ e ~ u l e , ~ . o i t i ~  
i m p . o r t s n t _ t o _ p p r o ~ d e ~ ~ e ~ e s t f r a m e _ w _ d - e d f o r e a r I y D r o r o w D e v a l i d a t i o n , _ ~ r f l i g ~ ~  
support software development, for: hardware checkout, and .for crew and ground support training, A .continuing; 
challenge is the armrate e r n d d m  o f ' h d w a e  by the mc?.'e!r. To &mile cost, the models skodd be developed and yeEcnJ 1c ?==:+-.l ~--. .-L ..A +L- -.-- -..- -.__ - .  _-- n&r=ea. -l---:-- -------L-- G:-&t --2 -A"+ -:-mi*= 
analysis. 
One way to reduce simulation costs is to factor the need for models into the hardware architecture far the 
envisioned space velu'clc. Consiclerlng the operational aspects during hardware design will avoid rhe need for. the 
pnrallel modeling system and additional overiiead prevalent in today's operations using custom models or 
sirnulatiom at each facility ar lab. An architecture ihar supports generic hardware executing models and using the  
samc interfaces as tbe real hardware allows the models to be used earlier and more effectively in thc development 
and operational support of the'nrxt generation space vehicles. For example, a model of a proposed hardware upgrade 
can be developed and uscd within rhe existing vehicle architemre to better d d e d e  the impacts to the overall 
system before thc acninl hmdwore specifications 3.r~ rulavsed 
"YVV ouuI Y U  &vq-%,&ZXL$ u;iGj;;gjiiitii iiic; 3'iiiiii'GS i i g j a i g i i  -~~GIII+, I p i Z U &  IpLG-pC-"G.SdV, A L A ~ ~ A L ~  p j U ; ; - i ; i i 3 D * ~ ~  
Figure 1. Model insertion In Caperational System 
The entire spnce u&cIe's system wou!d be set ~p BP B high-qeed 1ktrrcomected system of oetvorks. Each 
system (engines, environmenral, meuvering, landing gear, displays, flight control computer, mass memory, 
telcmctry, etc) wouId have its own logical coinputer resources. The redundant nerwork would provide 
communications, centralized tinring, and power capability for each system. All flight hardware would be desjgned 
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